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Explaining informal entrepreneurship in South-East 
Europe: a tax morale approach 
 
Colin C WILLIAMS*, Slavko BEZEREDI** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Conventionally, entrepreneurs participating wholly or partially in the informal 
economy were explained as rational economic actors doing so when the benefits 
outweigh the costs. However, the finding that many entrepreneurs do not operate in 
the informal economy even when the pay-off is greater than the costs has led to the 
emergence of a new tax morale approach. Grounded in institutional theory, this 
asserts that formal institutional problems lead to an asymmetry between the laws 
and regulations, and entrepreneurs¶ views on the acceptability of informality. The 
greater this asymmetry (measured by the level of tax morale), the greater is the 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. To evaluate this, interviews with a 
nationally representative sample of 1,430 entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
FYR Macedonia are reported. Using an ordered logit model, the contribution of this 
paper is to reveal that entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy have 
significantly lower tax morale, and that the formal institutional problems associated 
with lower tax morale include a lack of tax fairness, corruption and political 
instability. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed. 
 
Keywords: informal economy, shadow economy, entrepreneurship, tax morale, 
institutional theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To explain the participation of entrepreneurs in the informal sector, the 
conventional approach has been to view such entrepreneurs as rational economic 
actors who participate in the informal sector when the benefits outweigh the expected 
costs (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, many entrepreneurs do not 
participate in the informal sector even when the rational economic decision would 
be to do so. The outcome has been the emergence of a new tax morale approach 
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(Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Williams, 2018; Williams et al., 2017a). Grounded in 
institutional theory (North, 1990), this views informal sector entrepreneurship to 
result from formal institutional problems that lead entrepreneurs to view engagement 
in the informal sector as an acceptable activity, which results in the prevalence of 
informal entrepreneurship (Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Torgler, 2007; Williams 
and Horodnic, 2015 a,b; 2016a,b). The solution is therefore to seek improvements in 
tax morale, namely the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler and Schneider, 
2007). Until now, however, most studies of tax morale have focused on citizens. 
Little attention has been paid to evaluating the tax morale of entrepreneurs, and 
which formal institutional problems need solving to improve their tax morale. This 
paper seeks to fill these lacunae.     
As such, this paper advances the new tax morale approach in three ways. 
Firstly, and empirically, a significant positive relationship is revealed between the 
likelihood of entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector and their tax morale. 
Secondly, we advance the theoretical basis of this tax morale approach which is 
grounded in institutional theory by identifying some key formal institutional 
problems that lead to low tax morale, and therefore informal sector entrepreneurship. 
Third and finally, and from a policy viewpoint, we discuss the need to complement 
the currently dominant policy approach, which increases the costs of informal 
entrepreneurship by increasing the penalties and risks of detection, with a policy 
approach that seeks to improve tax morale and show how this can be achieved.    
To achieve this, section 1 reviews the emergent literature explaining the 
informal sector entrepreneurship from a tax morale perspective to formulate 
hypotheses regarding both the relationship between tax morale and informal 
entrepreneurship, as well as the formal institutional problems that lead to lower 
levels of tax morale. To evaluate these, section 2 then reports the data used, namely 
a 2015 survey of entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, involving 
1,430 face-to-face interviews. Section 3 then reports the findings, while the final 
section summarises the theoretical and policy implications.  
 
1. Informal Entrepreneurship and Tax Morale: Literature Review and 
Implementation of Hypotheses 
 
In this paper, informal sector entrepreneurs are defined as persons starting up 
and/or owning and managing a business venture that does not register and/or declare 
some of or all its sales to the authorities for tax, social insurance or labour law 
purposes, when it should do so (Ketchen et al., 2014; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams 
et al., 2017a). Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, formal entrepreneurs 
adhere to the formal laws and regulations. Informal entrepreneurs, meanwhile, 
engage in entrepreneurial endeavour outside of the formal laws and regulations but 
within the norms, values and beliefs held by citizens and entrepreneurs regarding 
what is right and acceptable (Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2009; 
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Welter et al., 2015). Criminal entrepreneurs, meanwhile, engage in endeavours 
outside of not only the formal rules of the game but also the socially shared rules of 
what is acceptable. The latter are not included in the analysis since none were 
interviewed. 
Conventionally, a rational economic actor approach has been used to explain 
informal sector entrepreneurship. Originally proposed by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) when studying tax non-compliance, it views entrepreneurs as operating 
wholly or partially in the informal economy when the benefits outweigh the expected 
costs of being detected and fined. To tackle informal entrepreneurship, therefore, the 
focus has been on increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection 
(e.g., Horodnic, 2018; ILO, 2017; Williams, 2014, 2018; Williams and Puts, 2017). 
Indeed, this focus on increasing the fines and probability of detection is the dominant 
policy approach adopted by the governments in all three countries here studied, 
namely Bulgaria (CSD, 2013; Stefanov et al., 2017a), Croatia (Stefanov et al., 
2017b; Williams et al, 2017b) and FYR Macedonia (Mojsoska Blazevski and 
Williams, 2018; Stefanov et al., 2017c).  
Despite the dominance of this rational economic actor approach in policy 
circles, the evidence of its effectiveness at reducing informality is less than 
conclusive. Although some scholars find that increasing penalties and the probability 
of detection reduces participation in the informal sector (Mas¶ud et al., 2015; 
Mazzolini et al., 2017), others find no significant association (Shaw et al, 2008; 
Williams and Franic, 2015, 2016), and yet others identify that increasing the actual 
or perceived penalties and probability of detection leads to higher levels of 
informality (Hofmann et al., 2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapano, 2015; Murphy, 2005, 
2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007). However, the key criticism of this rational 
economic actor approach is that many entrepreneurs do not participate in the 
informal sector even when benefits outweigh the costs, suggesting that they are not 
always taking a rational economic decision on whether to participate or not (Kirchler, 
2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007; Williams and Krasniqi, 2017).  
To explain this, a tax morale approach has emerged. This asserts that 
entrepreneurs have a greater likelihood of participating in the informal sector if they 
possess low tax morale, by which a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes is meant 
(Torgler, 2007). To provide a theoretical basis to this conceptualisation, institutional 
theory (North, 1990) has been drawn upon. Viewing institutions as the rules of the 
game, all societies are said to have both formal institutions, which are laws and 
regulations that define the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions, 
which are WKH ³VRFLDOO\ VKDUHG UXOHV XVXDOO\ XQZULWWHQ WKDW DUH FUHDWHG
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels´ (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). In the first wave of institutional theory, solely the formal 
institutional failings were focused on as explanations for the existence of informal 
entrepreneurship (see Williams, 2018). The problem, however, was that these formal 
institutional failures only lead to informal entrepreneurship if the formal and 
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informal institutions do not align. In a second wave of institutional theory, therefore, 
this has been recognised. It is argued that when the formal and informal institutions 
fully align, no informal entrepreneurship will occur, except unintentionally, because 
entrepreneurs will adhere to the formal rules of the game. However, when the formal 
and informal institutions are not in symmetry, which can be measured by the level 
of tax morale, participation in informal entrepreneurship becomes more prevalent 
(Williams, 2018).  
Until now, lower levels of tax morale have been found to be significantly 
associated in cross-country studies in Europe with not only higher levels of 
participation in the informal economy (Horodnic and Williams, 2016; Williams and 
Horodnic, 2015b, 2016a; Windebank and Horodnic, 2017) and higher levels of 
participation by employers in salary under-reporting (Williams and Franic, 2017; 
Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,c,d,e, 2016b, 2017a), but also with higher levels of 
tax non-compliance (Brink and Porcano, 2016; Lima and Zaklan, 2008; Lisi, 2015; 
Ostapenko and Williams, 2016; Stark and Kirchler, 2017; Sumartaya and Hafidiah, 
2014; Torgler, 2004; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008). Indeed, a 
strong negative correlation has been identified between tax morale and citizens 
participation in the informal economy with Pearson r values between -.46 and -.66 
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2011). For example, Torgler (2011) reveals how 
in post-socialist societies a one unit decrease in tax morale results in a 20 percentage 
points increase in the informal economy. Whether there is a similar strong correlation 
between tax morale and participation of entrepreneurs in informal entrepreneurship 
has so far not been evaluated. To evaluate this proposition, therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Tax morale hypothesis (H1): the lower the tax morale, the greater is the 
likelihood of entrepreneurs participating in the informal sector.  
 
What, therefore, causes lower levels of tax morale? In the third wave of 
institutional theory, it has been argued that formal institutional problems lead to an 
asymmetry between the laws and regulations, and views on the acceptability of 
informality. When surveying citizens, rather than entrepreneurs, numerous studies 
have found that the level of tax morale depends on whether citizens perceive the tax 
system as fair, or taxes to be inappropriately used by government. Those who do not 
perceive the tax system as fair possess lower levels of tax morale (Alasfour et al., 
2016; Çevik, 2016; Cyan et al 1LHVLREĊG]ND 7RUJOHU et al., 2008; 
Vythelingum et al., 2017). For example, tax morale is low when citizens believe 
there is state capture, by which is meant that individual businesses or groups of 
enterprises influence the formulation of laws and other government policies to their 
own advantage by illicit or non-transparent means (Fries et al., 2003). The outcome 
is preferential treatment and diversion of state resources towards them. For those 
excluded from these elites capturing state resources, the result is relatively fewer 
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public goods and services in return for the taxes and social contributions paid 
(Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2016). In countries where there is state capture, 
citizens therefore have lower levels of tax morale because they feel cheated (Chan et 
al., 2018; Saitta, 2017). To evaluate if this also applies when entrepreneurs are 
analysed, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Distributive fairness hypothesis (H2): the lower the perception that taxes are 
appropriately used by government, the lower is the level of tax morale. 
 
The level of tax morale is also related to the perceived quality of public services 
(Williams, 2018; Williams and Horodnic, 2017a; Williams and Martinez, 2014), 
such as the perceived effectiveness of government spending (Alasfour et al., 2016; 
Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Sipos, 2015; Vythelingum et al., 
2017). This can be measured by examining the perceived presence of public sector 
corruption (Khan and Quaddus, 2015; Round et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010), by 
which is meant the µmisuse of public office for private gain¶ (Svensson, 2005). This 
occurs in relation to entrepreneurs when government officials ask for bribes (e.g., a 
portion of a given contract) in return for a service. This service might be speeding 
up the approval process for an operating license, not writing a negative outcome for 
a workplace inspection, or helping entrepreneurs avoid delays in some other 
regulatory process such as the granting of a construction permit. Such public-sector 
corruption not only leads to resource misallocations and inefficiencies, but also to an 
additional (informal) tax on formal entrepreneurs, which can push them into the 
informal sector to escape such extortion from public officials. Where public sector 
corruption prevails, therefore, tax morale is likely to be lower. To evaluate this, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Public sector corruption hypothesis (H3): the greater the perceived level of 
public corruption among entrepreneurs, the lower is their level of tax morale. 
 
A further and final formal institutional failing here reviewed is the perceived 
and/or actual instability and uncertainty of the formal rules. Formal institutional 
instability and uncertainty result when there are continuous changes in the formal 
laws and regulations (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009; Williams and Shahid, 2016). This 
is often the case in many transition economies where entrepreneurs and enterprises 
are subjected to continuous ongoing alterations in the formal rules, and therefore do 
not expect the rules that apply today to remain the same in the future. For example, 
citizens and entrepreneurs in such countries see little point in paying compulsory 
social insurance contributions so that they can claim unemployment benefits or 
pensions in the future, because they have little reason to believe that when they wish 
to benefit, the same rules will apply. This lack of perceived permanency of the formal 
rules is a major problem for governments. It leads to low levels of tax morale. A 
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further related issue is that, when the perception is that the formal rules are not 
indigenous to the nation but are imposed from the outside, such as by supra-national 
institutions, tax morale will again be much lower (see Williams, 2018). Indeed, in 
such situations, it is perhaps unsurprising that populations and entrepreneurs look 
beyond the formal laws and regulations to the informal institutions for a more 
permanent shared set of norms and rules in relation to what is acceptable and what 
is not to govern and structure their economic activities instead of relying on formal 
laws and regulations (London et al., 2014; Mair et al., 2012), which can be very fluid 
and temporary. To start to evaluate this, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Instability of formal institutions hypothesis (H4): the greater the perceived 
political instability among entrepreneurs, the lower is their level of tax morale. 
 
2. Data, Variables and Model 
 
2.1. Data 
 
To evaluate these hypotheses on the relationship between informal 
entrepreneurship and tax morale, and the determinants of low tax morale, data is 
reported from a representative survey of entrepreneurs conducted in 2015 in 
Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, which are countries with some of the largest 
informal economies in Europe (Medina and Schneider 2018) and there is also a 
relatively low level of tax morale among its citizens (Stefanov et al., 2017a,b,c; 
Williams and Franic, 2015, 2016). The sampling methodology ensured that the 
samples are proportionate to the universe in each country with respect to firm size, 
region and sector. The owners or managers of a representative sample of 456 
businesses were surveyed in Bulgaria, 521 businesses in Croatia, and 453 businesses 
in FYR of Macedonia.  
Given that this is a sensitive topic, a rapport had to be established with the 
interviewees before asking any sensitive questions. In consequence, the interview 
schedule commenced with non-sensitive questions about their satisfaction with the 
business environment, and this was followed by questions on the acceptability of 
various non-compliant behaviours. Adopting a gradual approach, it was therefore 
only after these non-sensitive topics that questions were posed on whether they 
consider themselves affected by businesses using informal practices and their own 
engagement in informal economic practices. Interviewers were asked to rate the 
reliability of the interviews. Reviewing the responses, interviewers reported 
excellent or fair cooperation in 94 per cent of the interviews with entrepreneurs. 
Cooperation was bad, or the interviewer did not assess the reliability of the 
interviews, in only 1 per cent of interviews.  
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2.2. Variables 
 
To evaluate the hypotheses, ordered logit regression analysis has been used. 
The dependent variable is a categorical variable of the level of tax morale of 
entrepreneurs. To measure this, the following question was asked:  To what extent 
do you agree that underreporting annual revenue or turnover in order to evade taxes 
is acceptable. The responses were provided on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 
1, meaning completely disagree to 10, meaning completely agree. Here, this 10-point 
scale is recoded into a four point scale (Torgler, 2004; Torgler and Schneider, 2009): 
value 1 = low tax morale (responses from 4 through 10); value 2 = middle lower tax 
morale (response 3); value 3 = middle upper tax morale (response 2); and value 4 = 
high tax morale (response 1- ³FRPSOHWHO\GLVDJUHH´).  
The key independent variables used to evaluate the four hypotheses 
respectively, meanwhile, are the following: 
- Participation in informal economy: a categorical variable showing how often 
employers KLUHDQHPSOR\HHRQDFRQWUDFWZLWK³KLGGHQFODXVHVWKDWLVVRFLDO
insurance and tax contributions are paid based on for example the minimum 
wage, whilst the rest of the pay is paid undeclared, without a payslip´: 1 = never, 
2 = sometimes, 3 = in most cases, 4 = always.  
- Tax fairness: A categorical variable recorded using the following survey 
question - To what extent do you agree with the statements that the state does 
not give businesses enough in return for the taxes they pay. This variable is 
measured on a 10-point Likert scale, 1 means completely disagree, 10 means 
completely agree. 
- Corruption as an obstacle to the current operations of the companies. A 
categorical variable recorded using the following survey question - To what 
degree is corruption an obstacle to the current operations of the companies: value 
1=very severe obstacle, value 2=major obstacle, value 3=moderate obstacle, 
value 4=minor obstacle, value 5=no obstacle.  
- Political instability as an obstacle to the current operations of the companies. A 
categorical variable recorded using the following survey question - To what 
degree is political instability an obstacle to the current operations of the 
companies: value 1=very severe obstacle, value 2=major obstacle, value 
3=moderate obstacle, value 4=minor obstacle, value 5=no obstacle.  
A series of firm-level variables derived from previous studies analysing the 
likelihood of participation in the informal economy (Ali and Najman, 2018; Hudson 
et al., 3XWQLƼãDQG6DXND3XWQLƼãet al., 2018; Williams and Horodnic, 
2017a, b) are used as control variables as detailed below: 
- Sector: A categorical variable describing the main activity of the company: 1 = 
agriculture, 2 = hotels and restaurants, 3 = services, 4 = construction, 5 = 
transport and communications, 6 = trade, 7 = retail, 8 = industry, 9 = health, 10 
= other. 
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- Number of employees: A categorical variable describing the total number of 
currently employed people in the observed company (excluding owners and 
partners): 1 = sole proprietor¶s and micro (0-9 employees), 2 = small (10-49 
employees), 3 = medium and large (50+ employees). 
- Legal Status: A categorical variable describing the legal status of observed 
company: 1 = sole proprietorship, 2 = private limited company, limited by shares 
(LTD.), 3 = public Ltd Company (PLC), 4 = other. 
- Firm Age: A categorical variable showing for how many years the observed 
company has been trading (this includes under all ownerships and all legal 
statuses): 1 = less than 5 years, 2 = 6-10 years, 3 = 11-20 years, 4 = more than 
20 years. 
- Business locality: A categorical variable describing the kind of locality the 
observed company carries out its main activity: 1 = the capital, 2 = big city 
(regional centre), 3 = small town, 4 = village or rural area, 5 = the entire country, 
6 = both inside the country and outside the country, or outside the country only. 
- Vat registered: A dummy variable describing whether the respondent¶s company 
is VAT registered: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
For the descriptive analysis, the crude data for each variable is reported to 
provide an accurate description and to minimise the bias that would occur if the 
entrepreneurs who did not respond to all questions included in the analysis but did 
provide answers to some of the questions were excluded. In the ordered logit 
regression analysis, however, only respondents providing responses to all questions 
included in the analysis are included due to the technical requirements of this type 
of analysis. AnsweUV RI ³GRQ¶t know´ DQG ³UHIXVDO´ were eliminated in all 
estimations. Accordingly, an ordered logit model has been used without multiple 
imputations. 
 
2.3. Econometric model 
 
Given that the dependent variable is an ordered categorical variable, we apply 
an ordered logit model.1 Let y  be an ordered response taking on the values 
1, ,j K , where K  denotes the total number of alternatives of the dependent 
variable. The ordered logit model is derived from the following latent variable model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012) 
 
*
i i iy xE H  ,   
where 1, ,i N . N  denotes the sample size, E  is a row vector of the 
regression parameters, ix  is a column vector of explanatory variables and iH  is the 
                                                     
1
 Since  the dependent variable is an ordered categorical variable, the ordered logit model is a more 
appropriate econometric method than linear regression (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Long, 
1997).  
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logistic distributed random error.2 As usual, *iy  is unobserved, and for a K - 
alternative ordered logit model we observe 
*
1  if  i j i jy j yP P  d , 
where P µs represent unknown threshold parameters to be estimated along with E , 
0P  f  and KP  f . Then, the probability that observation i  will choose 
alternative j  is 
> @
   
*
1
1
1
                
                
i j i j
j i i j i
j i j i
P y j P y
P x x
F x F x
P P
P E H P E
P E P E



ª º   d¬ ¼
ª º   d ¬ ¼
   
, 
where F  is the standard logistic cumulative distribution function 
  .
1
z
z
eF z
e
   
The marginal effects are defined as 
> @    ' '1 .i j i j i
i
P y j
F x F x
x
E P E P Ew  ª º   ¬ ¼w  
To examine the null hypothesis whether at least one of the predictors¶ regression 
coefficient is not equal to zero in the model, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square 
test is used 
   202 FLR L L dfF   . 
0L  denotes the log likelihood with just the response variable in the model and FL  
denotes the log likelihood from the final iteration (assuming the model converged) 
with all the parameters. df  indicates the degrees of freedom of the Chi-Square 
distribution and is equal to the number of predictors in the model. We use STATA 
software for the purposes of the analysis. 
 
3. Findings 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive results of the level of tax morale of 1,430 
entrepreneurs interviewed in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia. This reveals 
that, overall, 37.9% have low tax morale, strongly agreeing that it is acceptable to 
underreport annual revenue or turnover to evade taxes, 8.1% have lower middle tax 
morale, 9.2% upper middle tax morale and 44.7% high tax morale, completely 
disagreeing that it is acceptable to underreport annual revenue or turnover to evade 
                                                     
2
 We assume that H  is logistically distributed across observations. Greene (2012) states that 
logistic and normal distributions generally give similar results in practice. This is also confirmed in this 
paper, ordered probit and logit models provide almost the same size of the marginal effect. 
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taxes. However, the level of tax morale of entrepreneurs varies across the three 
countries. In Bulgaria, a higher proportion of entrepreneurs have low tax morale 
(50.6%) than in Croatia and FYR of Macedonia (32.4% and 31.9% respectively). 
Concomitantly, a much lower proportion of entrepreneurs in Bulgaria have high tax 
morale (28.0%) than in Croatia and FYR of Macedonia (50.8% and 54.3% 
respectively). 
The level of tax morale of entrepreneurs also varies markedly according to the 
type of business venture that they operate. Commencing with whether entrepreneurs 
participate in informal practices, the finding is that there appears to be an association 
between their tax morale and whether they participate in informal practices. Some 
49.2% of those who never use informal practices have high tax morale but only 
38.0% of those who in most cases or always use informal practices have high tax 
morale. Similarly, 47.6% of those who in most cases or always use informal practices 
have low tax morale but only 36.6% of those who never use informal practices have 
low tax morale.  
Moreover, the level of tax morale markedly varies across sectors. A larger 
proportion of entrepreneurs have low tax morale in the hotels and restaurants sector, 
construction industry, retail and trade sectors and health sectors, while higher 
proportions have high tax morale in agriculture, transport and communications 
sectors. Similarly, a larger proportion of entrepreneurs who are sole traders and 
operate micro-enterprises have low tax morale compared with entrepreneurs who 
operate small and medium-sized businesses. So too do a larger proportion of 
entrepreneurs, who are sole proprietors and have a low tax morale compared with 
those operating limited companies, as well as a larger share of entrepreneurs who 
operate younger enterprises compared with more established entrepreneurs. It is also 
the case that a greater proportion of entrepreneurs operating businesses in the capital 
cities of Sofia, Zagreb and Skopje have low tax morale compared with those 
operating outside the capital cities, as do those who are not registered for VAT. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of tax morale in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYROM,% of 
entrepreneurs 
 Low tax 
morale 
Mid 
low tax 
morale 
Mid high 
tax morale 
High tax 
morale 
Total 37.9 8.1 9.2 44.7 
Country     
 FYR of Macedonia 31.9 7.4 6.5 54.3 
 Bulgaria 50.6 10.3 11.2 28.0 
 Croatia 32.4 6.9 9.9 50.8 
Participation in informal 
economy 
    
 Never 36.6 8.3 5.9 49.2 
 Sometimes 38.6 8.3 12.1 41.1 
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 In most cases/ always 47.6 7.4 7.0 38.0 
Sector     
 Agriculture 19.5 7.3 7.3 65.9 
 Hotels and restaurants 44.6 8.4 10.8 36.1 
 Services 34.9 15.8 7.9 41.5 
 Construction 42.4 4.0 9.6 44.0 
 Transport and communications 25.6 6.7 8.9 58.9 
 Trade 42.3 7.8 11.6 38.4 
 Retail 42.0 7.2 6.6 44.2 
 Industry 32.7 13.1 8.4 45.8 
 Health 40.4 5.8 5.8 48.1 
 Other 37.3 5.7 10.0 47.0 
Number of employees     
 Sole traders and micro (0-9 
employees) 
39.8 8.2 8.8 43.2 
 Small (10-49 employees) 25.8 6.8 9.1 58.3 
 Medium and large (50+ 
employees) 
25.0 9.1 20.5 45.5 
Business status     
 Sole proprietorship 51.4 11.0 8.6 29.1 
 
Private limited company, limited 
by shares (LTD.) 
35.7 7.6 9.8 47.0 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC) 40.0 7.7 3.1 49.2 
 
Other 29.5 9.0 10.3 51.3 
Operating period     
 Less than 5 years 45.6 6.6 6.6 41.2 
 6 - 10 years 40.4 8.9 9.7 41.0 
 11 - 20 years 35.6 8.9 10.4 45.2 
 More than 20 years 27.0 8.0 10.1 54.9 
Business locality     
 The capital 46.2 7.0 8.5 38.4 
 Big city (regional centre) 39.3 7.9 7.4 45.5 
 Small town 33.3 7.7 12.5 46.5 
 Village or rural area 38.3 12.8 19.2 29.8 
 The entire country 24.1 9.8 7.1 58.9 
 
Both inside the country and 
outside the country, or outside the 
country only 
23.9 13.0 10.9 52.2 
Vat registered     
 No 46.9 8.3 9.6 35.3 
 Yes 34.4 8.3 9.3 48.0 
State does not give businesses 
enough in return for taxes paid     
 Completely disagree 25.8 2.5 5.8 65.8 
 2 and 3 22.7 13.6 19.5 44.2 
 4 and 5 39.1 13.3 7.7 39.9 
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 6 and 7 46.1 6.5 6.9 40.6 
 8 and 9 46.2 7.6 10.6 35.6 
 Completely agree 38.8 5.7 7.2 48.3 
Corruption obstacle to operations      
 Very severe obstacle 47.3 6.6 8.8 37.2 
 Major obstacle 40.8 10.9 12.5 35.9 
 Moderate obstacle 35.8 8.5 13.0 42.7 
 Minor obstacle 37.4 9.4 7.9 45.3 
 No obstacle 25.7 6.0 3.5 64.8 
Political instability obstacle to 
operations     
 Very severe obstacle 54.6 6.8 7.3 31.4 
 Major obstacle 40.9 6.9 10.1 42.0 
 Moderate obstacle 40.5 13.0 13.9 32.6 
 Minor obstacle 32.5 9.0 6.6 51.8 
 No obstacle 24.8 5.0 6.8 63.4 
Source: Authors¶ own work based on the representative GREY Survey in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
FYROM 
 
There is, however, a marked relationship between the satisfaction of 
entrepreneurs with the state giving businesses enough in return for the taxes they 
pay, and their level of tax morale. Some 38.8% of the entrepreneurs who completely 
agree that the state does not give businesses enough in return for the taxes they pay 
have  low tax morale, and just 25.8% totally disagree with this statement. Similarly, 
65.8% of entrepreneurs who have high tax morale completely disagree that the state 
does not give businesses enough in return for the taxes they pay but 48.3% of them 
totally agree with this statement. There also appears to be a close association between 
corruption and the level of tax morale of entrepreneurs. Those viewing corruption as 
more of a problem have lower tax morale. Some 47.3% of the entrepreneurs who 
have low tax morale view corruption as a very severe obstacle to the operations of 
their businesses while only 25.7% of them do not view it as an obstacle. Similarly, 
65.0% of entrepreneurs with high tax morale view corruption as no obstacle to the 
operations of their businesses while only 37.2% of them view it as a very severe 
obstacle. And finally, there appears to be a close association between political 
instability and tax morale. Some 54.6% of entrepreneurs with low tax morale 
perceive political instability as a very severe obstacle to the current operations of 
their business but only 24.8% do not perceive political instability as an obstacle. 
Meanwhile, 64.8% of entrepreneurs with high tax morale do not perceive corruption 
as an obstacle to their business while 31.4% of them perceive it as a very severe 
obstacle.        
The shortcoming of these descriptive statistics, however, is that they do not 
hold constant the other variables, which may influence these correlations. To achieve 
this, Table 2 presents an ordered logit regression analysis. Starting with how firm-
level variables influence tax morale, ordered logit model reveals that entrepreneurs 
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in agriculture, services, retail, industry, transport and communications, are 
significantly more likely to have a high tax morale than entrepreneurs in the 
construction sector. So too are entrepreneurs employing 10-49 employees 
significantly more likely to have  high tax morale than entrepreneurs with 0-9 
employees. Interestingly, however, when other variables are held constant, there is 
no difference in the tax morale of entrepreneurs by the legal status of the business, 
except in the µother¶ category. There are significant variations, however, by firm age. 
Entrepreneurs operating older established business ventures are significantly more 
likely to have  high tax morale than entrepreneurs operating younger, less than five-
year-old enterprises. Whether they are VAT registered or not has no significant 
influence on whether they have high tax morale. Nevertheless, there are significant 
variations by the type of locality. Entrepreneurs in the village and rural area are 
significantly less likely to have high tax morale, and those operating across the entire 
country are significantly more likely to have  high tax morale than those operating 
in small towns. So are entrepreneurs in Bulgaria significantly less likely to have  high 
tax morale, while entrepreneurs in Croatia are significantly more likely to have  high 
tax morale, than those entrepreneurs operating in FYR Macedonia.   
Turning to the variable of participation in the informal economy, the finding 
is that entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy are significantly less likely 
than those not operating in the informal economy to have high tax morale 
(confirming hypothesis H1). Indeed, a one unit increase in the scale of participation 
in the informal sector worsens by 3.8 percentage points the proportion of 
entrepreneurs indicating the highest level of tax morale. 
 
Table 2. Estimation results from the ordered logit regression 
 Coefficient (Standard error) Marginal effect  
Country (RC: FYROM)   
 Bulgaria       -0.543 (0.190)*** -0.110 
 Croatia        0.323 (0.188)*  0.070 
Sector (RC: Construction)   
 Agriculture        2.155 (0.498)***  0.435 
 Hotels and restaurants        0.299 (0.330)  0.059 
 Services        0.647 (0.290)**  0.132 
 Transport and communications        0.780 (0.338)**  0.161 
 Trade        0.338 (0.251)  0.067 
 Retail        0.725 (0.284)**  0.149 
 Industry        0.524 (0.314)*  0.106 
 Health        0.549 (0.414)  0.111 
 Other        0.457 (0.249)*  0.092 
Number of employees (RC: Sole traders and micro)   
 Small (10-49 employees)        0.523 (0.236)**  0.112 
 Medium and large (50+ employees)        0.061 (0.362)  0.013 
Legal status (RC: Sole proprietorship)   
 
Private limited company, limited by shares (LTD.)        0.192 (0.190)  0.040 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC)       -0.004 (0.369) -0.001 
 
Other        0.737 (0.328)**  0.156 
Firm age (RC: Less than 5 years)   
 6 - 10 years        0.144 (0.178)  0.030 
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 11 - 20 years        0.344 (0.175)**  0.072 
 More than 20 years        0.652 (0.210)***  0.138 
Business locality (RC: Small town)   
 The capital       -0.140 (0.193) -0.029 
 Big city (regional centre)        0.072 (0.187)  0.015 
 Village or rural area       -0.565 (0.343)* -0.112 
 The entire country        0.754 (0.270)***  0.162 
 
Both inside the country and outside the country, or 
outside the country only        0.460 (0.369)  0.099 
Vat registered        0.218 (0.168)  0.045 
Participation in informal economy       -0.182 (0.088)** -0.038 
State does not give businesses enough for taxes paid       -0.051 (0.021)** -0.011 
Corruption obstacle to operations        0.137 (0.057)**  0.029 
Instability obstacle to operations        0.217 (0.056)***  0.045 
Number of observations 990 
LR chi2 (29) 184.2 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.080 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Tax morale measured on a four-point scale (1=Low tax morale; 2=Mid 
low tax morale; 3=Mid high tax morale; 4=High tax morale);  
(2) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the tax morale index (4) 
(3) Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Authors¶ own work based on the representative GREY Survey in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
FYROM 
 
To evaluate the association between various formal institutional problems and 
the non-alignment of entrepreneurs¶ views with the formal rules, we use the variable 
of whether they view the state as giving businesses enough in return for the taxes 
they pay. The finding is that entrepreneurs believe that the state does not give 
businesses enough in return for the taxes they pay are significantly less likely to have  
high tax morale than those who do not believe this (confirming Hypothesis H2). An 
increase by one unit in the perception that the state does not give businesses enough 
in return for the taxes they pay decreases by 1.1 percentage points the proportion of 
entrepreneurs indicating the highest level of tax morale. 
Hypothesis H3, meanwhile, examines whether public sector corruption is 
correlated with tax morale. The finding is that entrepreneurs who perceive public 
corruption as an obstacle are less likely to have  high tax morale (confirming 
Hypothesis H3). An increase by one unit in an entrepreneur¶s perception that 
corruption is an obstacle to their operations decreases by 2.9 percentage points the 
proportion of entrepreneurs indicating the highest level of tax morale. 
Finally, Hypothesis H4 explores whether perceived political instability is 
associated with the tax morale of entrepreneurs. The finding is that entrepreneurs 
who perceive political instability as an obstacle to their operations are less likely to 
have  high tax morale (confirming Hypothesis H4). An increase by one unit in the 
perception of entrepreneurs that political instability is an obstacle to their current 
operations decreases by 4.5 percentage points the proportion of entrepreneurs 
indicating the highest level of tax morale. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper has evaluated a new tax morale approach, grounded in 
institutionalist theory, which argues that formal institutional problems lead to the 
emergence of lower tax morale amongst entrepreneurs, which in turn leads to the 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. Reporting face-to-face interviews with 
1,430 entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, not only is 
participation in the informal economy associated with lower tax morale, but some 
specific formal institutional problems are identified that lead to lower levels of tax 
morale. 
In terms of the theoretical implications, therefore, this paper makes three 
advances. First, most studies explaining the informal economy from this tax morale 
perspective have focused on citizens or employees¶ level of tax morale. Few have 
evaluated the tax morale of entrepreneurs. This paper has filled this lacuna in South-
Eastern Europe. Secondly, by revealing that there is a strong association between 
participating in the informal economy and the tax morale of entrepreneurs, it 
confirms the usefulness of institutional theory. The greater the degree of asymmetry 
between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, values and 
beliefs of entrepreneurs (measured by their level of tax morale), the greater is the 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. Third and finally, and importantly for 
further advancing institutional theory, some of the formal institutional problems that 
are associated with lower tax morale have been identified. There is a significant 
association between the tax morale of entrepreneurs and their perceptions of 
distributive tax fairness, public sector corruption and instability in the formal 
institutions.    
Examining the implications for policy, this paper reveals that at a minimum, 
the dominant rational economic actor policy approach, which increases the risks of 
detection and penalties, needs to be complemented with policy measures to improve 
tax morale. To do so, two options are available. On the one hand, policy initiatives 
can be pursued to improve the tax morale of entrepreneurs such as tax education and 
awareness raising campaigns (e.g., by providing information about the benefits of 
operating in the formal economy, and showing the public goods and services 
received for the taxes paid). However, it is arguable that the tax morale of 
entrepreneurs will not alter unless the formal institutional problems that lead them 
to adopt non-compliant attitudes are resolved. On the other hand, therefore, the 
formal institutional problems that lead to low tax morale need to be addressed. As 
the ordered logit regression analysis in this paper reveals, this requires, at a 
minimum, improvements in distributive tax fairness, reduced public sector 
corruption and greater stability in the formal institutions.  
Despite these clear theoretical and policy implications, this paper nevertheless 
has limitations. Firstly, it reports results for only three South-East European 
countries. Future research, therefore, needs to evaluate whether similar significant 
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associations are identified when conducting surveys of entrepreneurs not only in 
other nations and European regions but also beyond. Secondly, although this study 
reveals that the propensity of entrepreneurs to operate in the informal economy is 
significantly associated with their level of tax morale, it only uncovers a few formal 
institutional problems correlated with lower tax morale. Future quantitative and in-
depth qualitative research is required to evaluate systematically a broader array of 
formal institutional problems associated with lower tax morale, so that governments 
can pursue targeted initiatives to improve tax morale and reduce informal 
entrepreneurship. 
In sum, this paper has displayed the importance of the tax morale approach, 
grounded in institutional theory, when explaining and tackling informal 
entrepreneurship in these three countries in South-Eastern Europe. If this now 
encourages similar analyses in other nations and European regions to build the 
evidence-base regarding the validity of this theoretical perspective, then this paper 
will have achieved a primary intention. If this then results in alterations in the policy 
approach used to tackle informal entrepreneurship, with greater emphasis put on 
addressing the low tax morale that results in the greater prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship, then it will have achieved its fuller intention.   
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